Every coup is always followed by the inevitable question of whether the military will try to cling to power. It must, therefore, be expected that the question is asked of the Council for National Security (CNS).

It may very well be that the promised election is a year away and that it's too soon to be talking about a perpetuation of power, but there are some emerging signs that the CNS may do just that.

First, there was the news that former executives from the Thai Rak Thai Party led by Somsak Thepsuthin were about to set up a new party. Then there is the picture of Somsak's very enthusiastic wai to Sonthi Boonyaratglin, leader of the CNS, before a friendly soccer match. These incidents might lead to a public perception that the military and certain politicians are again conniving to perpetuate military influence in politics at the end of the interim government.

Somsak's new party might be like the defunct Samakkhitham Party, which was set up as a vehicle for the 1991 coup makers to maintain their power in politics.

The new Samakkhitham-style party may be called Seri Thai Party. Somsak is believed to have around 150 former Thai Rak Thai Party MPs "in his pocket" for the new party, which is more than enough to form a core that could create the basis for a coalition government at the next election.

Sonthi is hardly likely to say whether he feels he can imitate Suchinda Kraprayoon, who led the 1991 coup. Perhaps, he is still looking for a political discourse that will differentiate him from former Army chief Suchinda, whose political aspirations caused one of the most tragic moments in recent Thai history.

On the surface, it would seem there are vast differences. First, Suchinda had political desire written all over him. After he led the National Peace-Keeping Council in a coup to topple then-prime minister Chatichai Choonhavan in February 1991, he encouraged a group of politicians to set up the Samakkhitham Party, which gave him the opportunity to take over as the new prime minister without standing for election.

Sonthi, on the other hand, has been at pains to remind the public he is purely a professional soldier who does not hunger for power.

Another important difference lies with the leaders who were overthrown. Thaksin Shinawatra is not Chatichai Choonhavan.

Former Chat Pattana Party leader Chatichai was able to return to politics after the NPKC coup, but he and his party could no longer play an important role. Chatichai could not take the reins of power again, so his party only sought opportunities to join others in forming coalition governments.

Chatichai had no deeply rooted political base, as he was only in power for two years and eight months, compared to Thaksin's five years and massive popular support.

Though dethroned, Thaksin has yet to be "de-fanged", as he has many powerful weapons: his billions, which are reportedly still in Thailand; his cohorts, many still in strong positions in the state apparatus; and millions of "grass-roots" members of Thai Rak Thai who may still be loyal.

To neutralise him and prevent any chance of a comeback, the CNS needs to neutralise these weapons.

It has to block or freeze Thaksin's money, sideline his technocrats and de-politicise the military, police and the entire state apparatus.

In the 40 days since the coup, it would seem the CNS has been too defensive.

Thaksin's funds may still be available to him.

And ominously, a political "undercurrent" appears to have emerged - former supporters deemed capable of subversive acts. Meanwhile, hints of a return by Thaksin seems to have overshadowed any other matter.

Thus, it would do the CNS's cause little good if they let the status quo remain. If Thaksin dares to return and tries to gain office again, his "weapons" could prove hard to beat.

Yet, it's possible the coup leaders have an option to perpetuate their power.

As one member of the CNS said, the only way to block Thaksin is to have a political party as a backup, otherwise they would face retaliation if Thaksin ever returned to politics.

Undoubtedly, if the CNS opts to try to retain power after the election by any means it can, fierce resistance would be expected. In fact, the CNS could use two other means - strict constitutional rules and legal crackdowns - to prevent Thaksin's return.

The military might, of course, be concerned that the next regime in power might alter the fundamental reforms and regulations they have installed. If the CNS allows the next government a completely free hand, it's even possible that another Thaksin-style regime could arise.

In order to maintain what they regard as positive aspects to their time in control of the country, the CNS might therefore deploy a rearguard action to stymie the politicians.

A third way the CNS could perpetuate power and not draw comparisons with Suchinda is to make everything look as democratic as possible.

Basically, Suchinda removed his uniform, donned a suit and stepped off the base and straight into Government House.

Sonthi, meanwhile, could be seeking to find a trusted person to run the country after the junta is dissolved, and the only way he can do that is to ensure that that person is the people's, not the military's choice.

If the CNS has ever thought about "doing a Suchinda", it needs to bear in mind that history could repeat. Black May - Suchinda's inglorious legacy - still haunts the country.

Jintana Panyaarvudh

The Nation