The procedure is laid down in the interim charter which came into force at the beginning of this month. The charter's preamble says it wants "to hasten the process of drafting a new constitution with wide participation from people at every stage". This wording calls to mind the process of drafting the old constitution between 1995 and 1997 when there were meetings held all over the country, surveys to collect opinions, and a lively debate in the media and on public platforms. The process starts with the appointment of a National Convention of 2,000 people, which recalls a similar body assembled for a similar purpose in 1973-4. That again was a time when opinions were gathered from various sections of society.

But these similarities to past drafts are misleading. On this occasion there is a much tighter time constraint. But also there seems to be a stronger desire to keep the process under close control. It's not clear that "wide participation from people at every stage" is really going to be part of the process.

The procedure starts with the King appointing 2,000 members of a National Convention. The head of the Council for National Security (CNS, the coup group) countersigns this appointment, which suggests that the members will be chosen by the CNS. The president of the new Legislative Assembly, who is also chosen by the CNS and formally appointed by the King, becomes President of the Convention with the sole power to decide its rules and procedures.

This National Convention has only one job: to select 200 of its own members for a Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA). It has a week to complete this task, and if it fails then the CNS does it instead. The CNS then picks 100 from the 200 to sit in the CDA.

The CDA then chooses 25 people to form a Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) and the CNS adds another 10 people. All these 35 can be members of the CDA or outsiders. In sum, all the constitution drafters are directly or indirectly chosen by the CNS.

The CDC then drafts a constitution, and makes the draft public along with an explanation of how and why it differs from the 1997 charter.

There is then a chance to propose some modifications, but the window is narrow. Only members of the CDA can propose amendments. Any slate of amendments needs the signatures of one-tenth of the CDA members, meaning 10 people. Each CDA member can support only one slate of amendments. These amendments are then submitted to the CDC, which compiles a report advising which ought to be accepted.

This whole phase, from the time the constitution draft is made public until the amendments are all collected and reviewed, has to take place within 30 days. This is the window for other opinions, and it's not opened very wide.

The CDA then has the opportunity to vote on the draft, but again the rules are rather restrictive. It can only vote yes/no on the draft as a whole. It can also vote on each amendment that appeared during the 30-day review process. It cannot introduce other amendments unless the CDC agrees, or unless three-fifths of the CDA sign in support.

Finally, the draft is submitted to a referendum. The referendum has to be held on a single day within a window from 15 to 30 days after the CDA accepts the draft. The voters have only the choice of a simple yes/no, with no opportunity for amendment. Approval requires a simple majority of those exercising their right to vote.

The final kicker comes in Clause 32 of the interim charter. If the CDA rejects the draft from the CDC, or if the process is not completed in 180 days, or if the draft is rejected at the referendum, the CNS and the Cabinet may select any of Thailand's past constitutions, take 30 days to make any amendments they like, and bring it into force.

The threat contained in this clause will hang over the whole process, especially voting on the referendum.

The interim charter contains a few give-aways about the kind of constitution we might expect. For example, there is a hint about the Senate. Members of the CDC are banned from "standing for election as a member of Parliament or holding the position of a senator" for two years. The latter part of this phrase clearly allows for senators to be appointed rather than elected. Of course, that could be considered just prudent drafting. But it also suggests that the likelihood of returning to appointed senators was rather top-of-mind among those designing this process for making the new constitution. That's not really a surprise. Appointed Senates have been a favourite device in constitutions written by Thailand's coup regimes.

Given this tight procedure and the possibility of some strong preferences among the people controlling the process, how is the "wide participation from people at each stage" going to be achieved?

The People's Alliance for Democracy has already decided to conduct its own parallel drafting process, using the 1997 constitution as its template. This strategy will send a powerful message to the CDC, but may not have much practical effect if the official draft is drastically different. Pressure has to be put on the CDA to do more than simply select the CDC and then consider its draft, as envisaged in the interim charter. The CDA must canvass opinions, and submit proposals to public scrutiny throughout the relatively short span of the drafting process.

Civil society must invest time in monitoring the process. The media have a huge responsibility to act as a public forum.

Chang Noi

Chang Noi is a pseudonym.