Judging from prevailing public sentiment, the new constitution will be based on the previous one - widely known as the "People's Charter" because of its idealistic aspirations and the high degree of public participation that went into its drafting - but with modifications to plug its many loopholes and additional safeguards against abuse by corrupt politicians. That implies that Thai society, from framers of the new constitution right down to ordinary people, must learn from its mistakes over the past nine years.

The 1997 constitution was a bold attempt by the reformist movement, comprising representatives from a broad cross-section of society that included the urban middle class, rural masses and civil society, to establish a rules-based political system characterised by smooth functioning of the three branches of government relatively free from corruption. The constitution laid all the groundwork necessary to achieve that objective, creating several independent bodies to monitor the performance of government as additional checks and balances.

People took pride in the constitution, as they should, because it guaranteed citizens' rights as comprehensive as those offered by the world's greatest democracies.

All that was very well and good, on paper.

It was understood that after the constitution was promulgated, society as a whole had to develop the institutional framework, particularly the creation of "independent" oversight organisations, relevant legal instruments and ways to make them somehow accountable to the public. The idea was to lay a firm foundation for the rule of law and greater public participation at all levels of government decision-making, in the hope that the country's fledgling democracy would be allowed to thrive, serve people the way it should and eventually take root in society.

But it was not to be. For a few years after the 1997 constitution was introduced, Thailand struggled to try to translate its lofty ideals into reality and there was a tug-of-war between the reformist movement, which pushed for progress, and corrupt elements in politics that were fighting to maintain the status quo. The progressive forces appeared to hold the upper hand until Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai Party burst onto the political centre-stage in 2001 with an ingenious combination of populist policies and blatant vote-buying.

It started with an aberration from the norm by one of the key independent oversight bodies: the Constitution Court's not-guilty verdict handed down in a most controversial fashion in August 2001 to Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who had been accused of asset concealment by the National Counter Corruption Commission.

From then on, one independent oversight agency after another, including the National Counter Corruption Commission, the Election Commission and even the first-democratically elected Senate, fell prey to the most sinister manipulation by Thaksin. He made profitable use of his fabulous personal wealth to buy favours and then proceeded to bend the rules unopposed in order to advance the selfish interests of himself and his cronies at the expense of public good.

An almost unbroken string of corruption scandals followed, and Thaksin and his cronies got away with all of them. All the while, the great majority of Thais showed extraordinary tolerance of corruption because they thought, quite wrongly, that it did not affect their standard of living. Many Thais woke up from this self-delusion when Thaksin's leadership crisis led to widespread mass protests and political uncertainty that tanked the country's economy.

The most important lesson that society must learn is that as long as there is public tolerance of corruption it will be hard to break out of the vicious circle it tends to engender.