It is undeniable that the September 19 military coup destroyed Thai democracy. But did we have a choice? Did we have democracy in the first place? And even more importantly, did we have rule of law in place?

"We have a surplus in democracy. But we have a deficit in the rule of law. A country may have rule of law without democracy, but it can't have democracy without the rule of law," says Dr Ammar Siamwalla, one of Thailand's most respected economists.

If we start with Ammar's assumption then we can clearly get to the bottom of the derailing of Thai democracy and rule of law. Before the coup, Thailand could probably claim that it had a surplus in democracy. We had a nice Constitution. We had elections. We had members of Parliament. We had an elected executive branch. We had institutions for checks and balance. We had a free press, although the broadcast media were under government control. We had NGOs. We had street protests. These were components of a democratic system.

But the problem was that we did not have any rule of law. Our democracy may have been flourishing, but our rule of law was dead in the water. With the rule of law dead, democracy could only flounder. Ammar is right that a country may have rule of law without democracy, but it can't have democracy without the rule of law. Democracy and the rule of law are not mutually exclusive.

Singapore's democratic system is not a model that many other countries would like to follow, but the island republic is equipped with a strong system of rule of law. Investors put their money into Singapore or Hong Kong because they trust their rule of law - not their democracies.

China is a communist regime. But it is the darling of global investors and companies. China has been able to suck in between US$50 billion (Bt1.9 trillion) and $60 billion a year in foreign direct investment. Again, investors do not care about China's political system at all. They are only interested in whether the rule of law in China is reliable enough to protect their assets.

Burma does not have democracy, nor has it put in place the rule of law. That's why few care to do business with the country.

Thailand did not have any problems with democracy, at least in its nominal form. But its rule of law was not functioning. Only the judicial system and the Bank of Thailand managed to keep relative independence during the Thaksin reign.

Thaksin Shinawatra came to power in 2001 via the democratic system enshrined in the 1997 Constitution. But during his reign, he subjugated Thailand's rule of law to serve the narrow interests of his regime. Thaksin consolidated his power by controlling Parliament, the executive branch, the independent institutions, half of the armed forces, the police, the public prosecutors, the bureaucratic system (with the permanent secretaries, director-generals and directors acting as his cronies), the CEO governors, the village headmen. Big businessmen were also his allies.

Instead of serving the public interest, the institutions, government agencies and bureaucratic system were more interested in protecting the interests of the state - or the Thaksin regime. Thaksin was clever with his carrot-and-stick method of control. If you were part of the regime, you got promotion and rewards. If you were against the regime, you were branded an enemy of the state.

Where was the rule of law then?

The independent institutions, which were supposed to act as pillars to support the democratic system, were broken down. The Constitution Court, with a controversial 8-7 vote, let Thaksin off the hook in the assets concealment case. The Anti-Money Laundering Office was ordered to probe the bank accounts and assets of the opponents of the Thaksin government. The National Counter Corruption Commission was rendered obsolete and kept in limbo so that it could not go after corruption scandals involving politicians. The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Stock Exchange of Thailand turned a blind eye to stock market manipulation linked to politicians. The police staged a scenario to create the impression that the life of the former prime minister was in danger from an assassination plot. The public prosecutors would never take up cases against those with good connections to the government.

Where was the rule of law then?

When the authorities could not lay a finger on those allegedly involved in the CTX bomb-scanner corruption scandal, they exemplified the poor state of Thailand's rule of law. Dozens of other corruption scandals were swept under the rug. Whenever the rule of law was about to perform its role, Thaksin and his people would be clever enough to find a way to block it.

The Thai elite, the middle class and the intellectuals were frustrated with Thaksin's clever tricks and his subjugation of the rule of law to suit his own regime. But the majority of voters in the rural areas liked Thaksin because of his charisma and his populist policies.

Therein lay the dilemma of Thai democracy. We had a popular leader, who came to power through a legitimate democratic system and who had genuine support from the majority. The ballot box gave him victory with a comfortable majority. Yet this popular leader also flouted the rule of law at his convenience.

If Thaksin had stayed on, he would have further consolidated his power until there was no longer any rule of law left. He would have won at the ballot box because the majority of rural voters do not have an understanding of the rule of law. If he were to be removed from power in order to salvage the rule of law in this country, only a military coup could do so.

In the end, the Thai elite decided to resort to a coup to remove Thaksin and set Thailand back on the learning curve of the rule of law. Ironically, the coup represents the mother of all breaches of the rule of law. But this is the dilemma of Thailand, where the ballot box is not the ultimate yardstick of democracy.

Thanong Khanthong