Well, it simply means that the caretaker prime minister doesn't know what he is doing. Or worse, it may mean that his "divide-and-rule" style has extended to the South with a vengeance.

It's not only a question of the right hand not knowing what the left hand is doing - more disturbing is the unrelenting effort of one arm of the government to try to undermine the other. And the final nail in the coffin is obviously the leader's obvious tendency to allow the split between the Army and police over the southern issue to continue to widen, sending the region hurtling down a dangerous path.

To say that caretaker Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has bungled the handling of the southern situation is an understatement. He has for all intents and purposes given up on trying to come up with new initiatives to put an end to the deteriorating situation in the deep South. Compounding the problem is the confusion he has created over the effective official chain of command down there.

First, he vowed to take personal charge of the situation in the region. When it was obvious that his arrogant style was creating more problems than solutions, Thaksin sent his right-hand man, caretaker Deputy Prime Minister Chidchai Vanasatidya, down to assume overall responsibility. That didn't go down well with locals who have made no secret of how repugnant they find police suppression and brutality in the southern border areas. Chidchai stood for the police and the police stand for what has gone wrong in the troubled South.

Thaksin, cornered by the futility of his constantly shifting policies, changed tactics again a few weeks ago when he declared that he was giving "full authority" over the three southern provinces to General Sonthi Boonyarataglin, the Army's commander-in-chief.

Nobody is quite clear as to what "full authority" means. At one point, the caretaker premier even suggested that "full authority" meant that the Army chief was in a position to exercise full prime ministerial power in the three southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat. That, of course, was never spelt out. And even if that was Thaksin's real intention, such a move would raise further questions as to just where the line should be drawn between the powers of a premier and that of an Army chief if and when the crunch should come.  If the issue of the division of labour and authority was left deliberately ill-defined, it is clear that Thaksin, by first shifting responsibility from himself to Chidchai and then to Sonthi is either finally admitting personal defeat in the South or, more ominously, passing the buck to the Army chief should the situation get out of control.

Sonthi, of course, is no novice in the game. It's clear to all who care to observe that he is no Chidchai. In other words, he is not Thaksin's henchman or sidekick. His record as a professional soldier has enhanced his reputation due to his independent-minded approach to national issues, political or otherwise.

In his first official statement after assuming "full responsibility" for the southern insurgency, Sonthi demanded that "politics" be removed from all anti-insurgency operations. He was in effect sending a signal that his analysis, attitude and approach might be poles apart from that of Thaksin, and unless "full authority" meant that he could pursue this expanded mission as he sees fit, even if it means offending the political leadership, then he would not be taking on the challenge.

The first litmus test came almost immediately. Sonthi, while continuing with a firm military hand in the South, also realises that without a political solution through some kind of a dialogue, more lives will be lost and unnecessary violence continue to plague the country, inevitably putting a growing dent in the country's sense of stability.

That's obviously why he began the process with an olive branch, albeit through a cautious gesture, by expressing his willingness to hold talks with leading personalities in the separatist movement.

It was a wise, tentative move to test the waters, although obviously the Army chief has yet to decide whom to talk to and on what terms. It was diametrically opposed to Thaksin's hawkish approach towards the southern issue thus far.

Thaksin and his lieutenants have labelled the insurgents "thugs and criminals" not worthy of any political recognition. Sonthi, reflecting a much more enlightened attitude shared among a large segment of the country's more liberal-leaning elements, proposes to blunt any possible foreign interference by engaging legitimate dissident groups in the South in dialogue instead of pushing them into any possible terror-related groupings.

Sonthi's position, in this regard, is closer to that of the recently dissolved National Reconciliation Commission, headed by former Premier Anand Panyarachun, than that of Thaksin.

The paradox here is glaring, of course. Anand's commission was named by Thaksin himself, in what he claimed was part of a "broad-minded" approach to listen to "all sides of the conflict". But it was more theatrical than real.

Most of the commission's "dovish" recommendations aimed at reconciliation have either been rejected outright or shelved for good.

Sonthi, seeking to pacify rather than engage in an armed confrontation with the southern dissidents, is facing a similar obstacle. Thaksin's right-hand man Chidchai has wasted no time in setting up roadblocks against his first attempt to defuse the growing tension down South by proposing talks with the rebels when the time and agenda are right. "How can we possibly put them up on a pedestal? It's out of the question," Chidchai says.

Who's Chidchai speaking for? Where's the "full authority" Thaksin promised Sonthi? Who, in short, is really in charge, Mr Prime Minister - that is if we still have, for all practical purposes, a prime minister for the southern people.

Suthichai Yoon