The sudden collapse of the regime freed them from fear: the rampant corruption, state violence and political disappearances were over.

The post-Suharto era was initially seen as an age of freedom and good governance. Reformasi (reform movement) soon dominated the public sphere and became the main political agenda.

It was later argued that the fall of the New Order regime and the reform era did not bring about a new and ideal form of politics. The path to reform proved rocky and full of obstacles. The obstacles to reform were not only the legacies of the past, which had their roots in politics, but also the efforts of the new ruling elite to "re-institutionalise" the old regime.

For over three decades, Suharto successfully assembled a pyramid of power where he put himself at the top together with his family, close relatives and loyal cronies.

At the lower level, the military and top technocrats ran the government and managed the economy. At the third level business giants, including successful Chinese tycoons, earned privileges by running daily economic activities. At the lower levels, the bulk of the population, including ordinary people and an independent middle class were out of power, but retained their resentment against the malpractice of power.

The pyramid of power ran from the apex down to the local village level. The military became a vanguard of the pyramid, securing it from opponents. Suharto also established tight control over the bureaucracy to ensure that all levels of the pyramid would implement his initiatives. The Golkar party played a strategic role in establishing and simultaneously displaying the legitimacy of the regime.

Suharto's pyramid of power produced the determinant role of the military in politics, the politicised and corrupt bureaucracy, Golkar, the uneasy relationship between the central and local governments, a malfunctioning check and balance system and the absence of a credible legal system and law enforcement.

These legacies constitute key issues of the reform agenda. They range from the reform of the military and the establishment of civil supremacy, to the reform of bureaucracy with more transparency and accountability in public policy formulation and implementation, to the reform of the relationship between the central and regional governments with greater autonomy in the hand of the latter, to the redefinition of the checks and balance system, and legal reforms which make the rule of law respectable and enforceable.

Various achievements may be listed here. Dozens of parties have been established. There are no more free seats for the Indonesian Military in the legislature. The former rubber-stamp legislature has been redefined. Criticism of the government is no longer taboo. Every citizen has the right to organise mass rallies in demonstrating their complaints about the government's performance.

Why are Indonesians still not happy with this long list of achievements? What's wrong with our reformasi?

Many ordinary people claim that everything is wrong. My best students argue that reformasi is going nowhere as our leaders do not know which way to go.

I myself am more of a sceptic than a pessimist. We must realise that there has been too much dreaming about better prospects and very little commitment to reform.

Strong, stable foundations were not established during the eight-year reform period. The disorientation of our leaders continues to encumber the reform agenda. Disputes between political leaders have been a salient phenomenon in post-Suharto Indonesia. This keeps the reform flag waving, but in slow, unpredictable motion.

This disorientation shapes the way in which Indonesians evaluate the performance of every president. Within a short time, two successors of Suharto, BJ Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid, had to step down from power, facing humiliation through their failures to deliver true reform. Megawati Soekarnoputri, who took power following the fast-track impeachment of Abdurrahman Wahid in mid-July 2001, was described by her opponents and the media as a president of little action.

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has also been the subject of criticism. His careful style of leadership makes him popular as a President without strong self-confidence. His vice president, Jusuf Kalla, frequently acts without consulting him.

The new Indonesia has a president whose position is supposed to be strong because he was directly elected by the people.

But it does not make any difference if the strong president lacks a strong personality. SBY has to build a consensus with all political forces as well as to work within the policies laid down by the all-powerful legislature.

There is scepticism over the solidity and professionalism of the Cabinet because of the contradictory interests among its ministers.

Political reform requires political and economic stability, a relatively strong national identity and a strong leadership. Indonesia lacks these favourable preconditions.

Nowadays, the prospects for political and economic reforms have faded. Reforms make life easier for everyone. Unfortunately, this is not the case here.

The writer lectures on International Relations at Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung.

The Jakarta Post is a member of the Asia News Network.

Yulius P Hermawan

The Jakarta Post

Bandung