Fortunately, he wrote it nearly a decade before Thaksin Shinawatra came to power. The scholar did not know such a leader would emerge and put a curse on democratic theories around the world. Otherwise, his optimism in pronouncing the "end of history" and the start of the universalisation of liberal democracy would be counterbalanced by what is going on in Southeast Asia, especially Thailand.

Since the dissolution of Parliament in February and the nullification of the April 2 election, Thaksin has proved beyond any doubt that he is not and will not become a man who believes genuinely in democracy and good governance and has the public interest at heart. However, as a former policeman and CEO, he has demonstrated to the utmost his ability to use his electoral mandate in the most innovative and perhaps destructive ways over the past six years. He is like a rapper-deejay, mixing democratic jargon, such as in his letter to US President George W Bush, with capitalistic metaphors to advance his power and wealth. His songs might seem incoherent sometimes, but their most important feature is that they sound good, stirring up the heartbeat.

Unlike Thai leaders before him, Thaksin is unique in being a political innovator as well as destroyer at the same time. This dual personality was highly visible during and after the commemoration of HM Majesty the King's 60 years on the throne. It is taboo to discuss it in detail, but suffice to say that whatever he said, did and even the outfits he donned were simply an exercise in window dressing. Amazingly, in the past 16 months he more than anyone has had to prove that he shares the sentiment expressed by the rest of the nation.

The most absurd thing in all this is rather simple: Thaksin wants to be recognised as the father of modernity of Thailand and not be hampered by historical links and traditional thinking. Minutes after he learned that he won the January 2005 election by a landslide, he declared in a nationwide television broadcast that he would not be a prisoner of history. Since then, his eclectic comments have been full of riddles concerning his contributions to Thailand and its future political system. His letters to US and East Asian leaders have been an affidavit of this swollen and unspoken desire.

A few days ago, he confirmed media reports that Thai intelligence agencies had uncovered a plot to assassinate him. This was not the first time. The average Thai would have heard this rumour more than once in the past six years. The point is that, every time Thaksin is in a slump, this psychological yearning for self-importance resurfaces.

It is interesting that Fukuyama did address this salient point. He said the desire for recognition is the most specifically political part of human personality because it is what drives men to want to assert themselves over other men. "It is the part of the personality which is the fundamental source of the emotions of pride, anger and shame, and is not reducible to desire, on the one hand, or reason on the other," Fukuyama wrote.

Thaksin's key aides, including Pansak Vinyratan, Phumtham Vejjayachai and Prommin Lertsuridej, argued persistently that Thaksin alone (coupling his upbringing, ethos and ideals) has been able to improve the fundamental needs of the Thai people: food, shelter and clothing in the most substantive ways since his political ascension in early 2001. No one else had ever done that. Thaksin wants recognition commensurate with whatever he or his aides perceive to be his accomplishments. In more ways than one, the Bt73-billion deal with Temasek Holdings of Singapore in January that he orchestrated was a lifetime achievement award, epitomising as it did the creative use of a blend of power and greed under his leadership. Their argument is more about using democracy as a means to enrich society, not to promote political checks and balances, good governance or responsiveness to citizens' priorities.

As long as people get rich, they contend, no one should care whether the mice are caught by white cats or black cats. There is nothing wrong at all if Thaksin and his cronies make more money than commoners as long as everyone is making money - that is the conventional wisdom under Thaksinomics. His job is to create an environment conducive to making money, without discerning the consequences. This is a dangerous proposition as it rests on the notion that the ends justify the means. If we care to notice, this is a very "police" thing for Thaksin to do.

During his caretaker period, all of Thaksin's endeavours have focused on sustaining his recognition. The foreign trips, the letters to foreign leaders, his role in the recent commemoration, the controversial speech to bureaucrats and many other undisclosed undertakings all expose his need for recognition. He also met with the editorial boards of major newspapers, promising that he would be more open and a better leader willing to listen more to the public. None took him seriously.

In that sense, Thaksin is different from other leaders in the developing world. He knows how to get and keep power. Thaksin and his aides still believe that development must come before democracy. The problem is, if this paradigm persists, the future of Thai democracy will depend more on the character and whims of its leadership than on factors such as economic performance, pluralism and governance.

Kavi Chongkittavorn