Given the current focus on India's emergence on the global stage, Thai policy-makers and business leaders have lamented not knowing enough about India despite thousands of years of historical and cultural links between Thailand and the subcontinent. Expectations that economic and political relations would be entrenched by now have proven unrealistic.

Who is to blame? Thailand missed a good opportunity to hook up with India back in the 1980s when former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi became the first Indian leader to visit Bangkok in decades. Thailand was among the few Southeast Asian countries at that time that recognised India's potential. Bangkok overlooked New Delhi's diplomatic ties with Vietnam-backed Cambodia in 1981 and proceeded to woo India. After all, Thailand was the first Asian country to give diplomatic recognition to India after its independence, in 1955.

Discussions by business and government leaders about Thai-India relations often lack the power and thrust that characterise discussions of Thai-Chinese relations. A Thai-India free trade agreement has been bogged down. Only a handful of Thai companies have invested in India and vice versa. Bilateral trade is still very low although the potential is there.

In China, however, Thailand's private sector is making big strides. Charoen Pokaphand's (CP) investment in the mainland has become the hallmark of bilateral ties. Any talk on Thai-Chinese cooperation would not be complete without mentioning how massive and far-reaching CP's influence in China has become.

Still, Thailand has yet to manage ties with the two Asian giants in a holistic way. Although they have already made inroads into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, India and China have not yet coordinated their policies towards Asean as the groupings other dialogue partners have done. This is good news, however. It means Asean members, including Thailand, still have room to design their own approach to the two powers in bilateral terms.

Thai policy-makers aim to move one step further. The central issue is how the government can synchronise relations with India and China to ensure mutual benefits.

Thai-India relations are the less problematic of the two because they do not have the kind of strategic implications and challenges that Thai-Chinese relations have often generated since the end of the Cold War. That helps explain why Thais hope they can make the friendship with India more unique and strategic by taking advantage of the latter's growing clout in international and regional diplomacy, information technology and other areas.

Thailand and India have more common interests than ever before. As major democracies in Asia, they speak the same language. Relations with India can advance without fear of causing consternation to other countries, as ties with Japan often do to China.

Thais have pointed the finger at red tape and bureaucracy in India, saying it restrains cooperation. But with India opening its economy to foreign investment, Thailand has still been unable to fully capitalise on India's potential.

Thai-Chinese relations cannot be discussed in isolation from other bilateral relations, especially with the United States or Japan. Thailand is a major non-Nato ally and has certain obligations. However Thai-Chinese relations evolve in the near term, they will have direct policy implications on US global strategies.

This is the key policy challenge the Thaksin government has failed to seriously address over the past five years. Although the government has chosen to cooperate with the US on the global campaign against terrorism, it has failed to iron out other aspects of their relations.

On nurturing Thai-Chinese relations, Thailand's national interest must rest on thorough considerations that are not based on personal or corporate interests. They must encompass broad imperatives so that Thailand can make the most from its relations with China.

Talks between Thailand and China have often focused on economic and investment cooperation. Thailand has yet to focus on the value of a strategic partnership with China, something China embraced when it initiated its plan for 21st century cooperation, first with Thailand in 1989 and subsequently with the rest of Asean.

A strategic partnership with China needs to be studied seriously because of Thailand's strategic location and its relations with the US-led alliance at regional and international levels. China has already forged a series of new political and security alliances with Asean members bilaterally and collectively.

But no Asean country really feels the pressure brought about by these heavyweight ties as much as Thailand. In the just completed draft Thai-Chinese plan of action, which will be approved soon by both governments, political and security cooperation takes priority. This includes military exercises and cooperation to fight separatism.

Interestingly, Thai policy-makers believe they can follow a policy of accommodation with the US and China by taking up an equidistant stance. However, neither the global nor the regional environment permits Thailand to pursue that approach to any great result. The notion that one can have their cake and eat it too is no longer tenable. When push comes to shove, Thailand might have to choose sides. It can ally with either the US or China; Thailand cannot have it both ways.

Kavi Chongkittavorn