For one thing, Italy is a more advanced democracy. If something similar to the Ample Rich-Temasek-Shin Corp saga happened there, and Italians felt nothing about it and re-elected Berlusconi, then we might take The Economist's advice seriously. If President George W Bush were found to have set up a shadowy firm suspected, with solid grounds, of helping his family in malicious tax or stock-market schemes, got away with it scot-free, and Americans said, "Fine, we'll just let election results be the judge and complain no more," then we might accept The Economist's concept of democracy. We might just tell ourselves, "Okay, this is a fact of life. Let's go to the polls and worry no more about our national problems."

In a democratic world, everyone is entitled to an opinion, and the magazine has every right to express virtual sympathy for the "Thai Con". But with all due respect, we expected better-researched homework by the magazine on the state of Thailand's checks-and-balances mechanisms than: "The political system in Thailand was not as badly broken as Thaksin's opponents have often claimed. If it were, he would not have had to sell almost all of his family's assets in January, including the television station that is supposed to have been so central to his power. That sale made the most recent election at least reasonably free and fair."

If the magazine assumes that Thais are political animals who love staging street protests to oust national leaders at every opportunity, it is dead wrong. And its apparent optimism towards our checks and balances beggars belief. Those who rallied at the Royal Plaza, Sanam Luang and Government House did so because there was nothing else they could have done. The Constitution Court? Its record speaks for itself. The National Counter Corruption Commission is close to non-existent. The Anti-Money Laundering Organisation couldn't care less. The Election Commission and the Senate? The Economist can interview any academic in the land for an answer or search the Web archive of any Thai newspaper.

Thais, especially those the magazine considers the "elite", are fun-loving and easily forgiving. That is partly to blame for our current pain. The nation forgave Thaksin in 2001 for an unmistakable share-concealment scheme, because, just as The Economist must have been pleased about, he had won a landslide election victory. We tolerated his contempt for human rights and other democratic principles and massive corruption scandals for the same reason - this was a man endorsed by 19 million voters.

As we bent the rules for him, just as The Economist would have liked, his dubious political and business empire grew into near-omnipresence. The April 2 snap election was staged when no one but Thai Rak Thai was ready for it. It was staged with a remorseless Thaksin adamantly insisting nothing was even slightly wrong with the Temasek affair. It was staged when the Constitution Court was shrugging off every public complaint about that deal. It was staged when media intimidation by the government was growing from bad to worse.

Did The Economist expect the "mobs" to go the ballot boxes and accept the outcome while knowing the election would give them nothing but more of the same? In the magazine's democracy textbook, the answer must be an uncompromising and resounding "Yes!" But for the "mobs", the answer is "No!" This pains them, but it's more painful that the likes of The Economist are more ready to bend the rules for Thaksin, not for their peaceful, civilised albeit desperate struggle.